because, although HIV/AIDS-related deaths numbered around 1.8 million in 2009 (UNAIDS, 2010: 19) (and have been well over 1.5 million each year throughout the last decade (UNAIDS, 2008: 217) ), if mortality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a health issue to appear on security agendas then we need to provide a different explanation as to how HIV/AIDS has come to be positioned there.
manner in which HIV/AIDS had been securitized but also -and crucially for the purposes of this article -concerning the nature of securitization processes.
In recent years the Copenhagen School's version of securitization theory has come under attack on a number of theoretical grounds. In this article we use the case of HIV/AIDS as a basis from which to intervene in some of these debates and open up further theoretical avenues for exploration. In theoretical terms we align ourselves more closely with some of the critics of the Copenhagen School -in particular Thierry Balzacq. However, we do not merely seek to apply Balzacq's arguments to the 4 So called because much of the key work on securitization theory in the 1990s was carried out at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, Denmark. 5 Amongst those making the claim for the significance of securitization theory are Ciută 2009: 301-5; McDonald 2008: esp. 563; Hacke and Williams 2008: 778-9; Huysmans 1997; Williams 2003: 511. 6 HIV/AIDS has also begun to appear in Security Studies text books, e.g.: Collins (ed.), 2006; Hough, 2004; Smith, 2010. of multi-level securitizations. We argue that there were a number of separate but interlinked securitization processes in the HIV case, beginning with a domestic US securitization (in which US security communities attempted to persuade the Clinton administration that HIV/AIDS was a security issue), followed by the attempt by the US, spearheaded by key individuals in the Clinton administration, to forward securitization through the UN Security Council, and finally the attempt by a variety of actors, drawing on the precedent of Resolution 1308, to persuade the global community that HIV/AIDS constituted a threat to international peace and security. In each of these stages the securitizing actors and the audience to whom they were addressing themselves changed. This raises a number of important issues about the actor-audience relationship which highlight the importance of intersubjectivity and stress the role of the audience, the downplaying of which has been one focus of criticism of the Copenhagen School (e.g. Balzacq 2010: 20) . It also calls into question the findings of much of the earlier work on the securitization of AIDS which treated the Security Council's Resolution as proof of successful securitization. We suggest that this is an over-simplistic understanding of what happened in the Security Council, and that in fact Resolution 1308 it is best characterized as a securitizing move. Thus this multi-level understanding of securitization also highlights the need to subject the nature (and motives) of securitizing actors to greater scrutiny.
Second we argue that securitization is not a binary condition -that an issue is either securitized or not. Rather we suggest, via an examination of the HIV/AIDS case, that it is a continuum and that securitization may consequently be partial, with different audience members placed at a variety of positions along this continuum. 7 In identifying a continuum and the potential for partial securitization we engage with a concern of McDonald's (2008) over how we know when an issue has 7 It is tempting borrow the term 'spectrum disorder' from the medical community to describe this continuum (and thereby reflect the Copenhagen School's normative bias against securitization). But as Elbe (2005 Elbe ( , 2009 points out, the securitization of HIV/AIDS has positive as well as negative effects and therefore we retain the term 'continuum'.
been successfully securitized. McDonald implies a binary condition whereas we suggest that such a definitive judgment may not always be appropriate. Beyond this, we suggest that practices rather than language may in some cases give a clearer indication of the extent to which an audience has actually been persuaded.
Third, we make an intervention in the ongoing theoretical debate over the relationship between speech acts and 'empirical reality', using the arguments of commentators such as Balzacq (2005, 2010) over the limits of the speech act in the process of securitization to look at the role of empirical evidence. Thus we join Balzacq and others in challenging the Copenhagen School's primary focus (especially in their early work) on performativity. Using Vuori's (2008) classification, we suggest that the securitization of HIV/AIDS was a claim speech act in that it attempted to raise an issue on decision makers' agendas. With such claims 'the speaker has to present or to have proof for the truth of his/her claim and it should not be obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer knows the truth of the claim already' (Vuori, 2008: 77) . Balzacq (2010: 13) argues that the mere application of 'the rules' of a securitizing speech act are not enough, and that 'to win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality.' Here we push this argument further, suggesting that when doubts are raised about that 'reality' the foundations of security issues can be undermined, and that desecuritization can ensue. Specifically we are interested in the manner in which doubts which arose in the mid-2000s over the empirical evidence supporting the securitizing claims, in particular the links between HIV/AIDS and state stability (including prevalence amongst militaries). These doubts over the evidence, we argue, further undermined the extent to which some key Council members were persuaded by the securitizing claims, and ultimately played a role in precipitating a de-securitization of HIV/AIDS. In forwarding this argument we are not suggesting that an empirical 'truth' exists independently; rather that the speech act constructs that truth by shaping our understanding of reality (Balzacq, 2005: 181) which is then amenable to empirical investigation. What we wish to suggest is that the speech act(s) which constituted the securitizing move(s) for HIV/AIDS also established a series of truth claims which could be examined and which, when found wanting, formed part of the de-securitization process.
The article is organised into three sections. The first locates our position within the debates on securitization. Its purpose is to identify our 'jumping off point' from which we hope to develop and contribute to securitization theory. The second section briefly presents the conventional account of the securitization of HIV/AIDS which has been presented in the IR literature. 8 The final section builds on the first two, arguing that the securitization process in the case of HIV/AIDS was more nuanced than many have suggested, and using these insights to discuss how securitization theory might be advanced.
Securitization theory
The development of securitization theory begins with two key pieces by Ole Waever (1995; 1997) and his keynote book with Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) . As Holger Stritzel has argued (2007: 359) , from the beginning there is a tension at the heart of securitization theory between two distinct 'centres of gravity'. The first of these concentrates on the performative and self-referential nature of the speech act and is most evident in the two pieces by Ole Waever, influenced by the philosopher John L. Austin (1962; 1971: 13-22) . Stritzel identifies this post-modern/post-structural centre of gravity as an 'internalist' reading of securitization.
However it is the second centre of gravity which we are more interested in. This features somewhat more strongly in the joint work of Ole Waever with Barry Buzan (especially in A New Framework for Analysis, also with Jaap de Wilde, which represented something of a shift from Waever's earlier internalist work towards a more constructivist-influenced approach) but has been even more clearly in evidence in the work of other securitization theorists. This 'externalist' reading leans more heavily towards social constructivism rather than poststructuralism and focuses more on the process of securitization in which the speech act forms the move which initiates the securitization process, leading to an emphasis on the intersubjective rather than the performative aspects of securitization.
In issue… not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as a threat.' (p.24) The process by which this happens is securitization: 'the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue' (McDonald, 2008: 567) . It is the (re)presentation of an issue as an existential threat which makes a speech act a securitizing move. As Ciută notes (2009: 310), the word 'security' is not therefore necessary for a speech act to constitute a securitizing move, nor does the use of the word make a speech act a securitizing move. Rather it is this linkage to an existential threat, usually to a state, which is vital, and words such as 'threat' or 'survival' are equally significant in making a speech act a securitizing move. This is not to endorse the practice of securitization however. Indeed throughout the Copenhagen School there is a normative bias against securitization and in favour of normal politics. Ciută, 2009; Hansen, 2000; McDonald, 2008; McSweeney, 1996; Stritzel, 2007; Williams, 2003) . It is not our intention to engage with all of these debates but rather to start from a particular position and to develop securitization theory further along this trajectory. From the discussion above it will already be apparent that our focus is on the process of securitization and of particular interest is the work of Balzacq, in particular the arguments he makes which increase the importance of the 172) that securitization is better understood not as a self-referential speech act, but as a strategic or pragmatic practice whereby discourse is used to increase public awareness or adherence to an idea is particular useful for us. Balzacq suggests (2005: 182) that in these circumstances 'the success of securitization is contingent upon a perceptive environment'. This environment is not simply the immediate hazard or situation, but the zeitgeist which influences the manner in which the audience hears the speech act (p.192).
Securitizing HIV/AIDS
The securitization of HIV/AIDS, particularly following the UN Security Council's intervention in 2000, has received considerable attention within International Relations and Security Studies. What has emerged over the last decade has been a more-or-less agreed account of the process by which HIV/AIDS was transformed into a security issue. Here we briefly set out that standard history. It begins in January of 2000 when, under the US Council presidency and during a month-long focus on Africa, the Security Council met to discuss the impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa.
Importantly from the perspective of securitization theory, the discussion frequently and explicitly referred to the disease as an existential threat to states, especially to their political stability. Typical of the contributions were those of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the Executive Director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, both of whom emphasised the social and economic crises caused by HIV/AIDS and the risk to political stability (United Nations, 2000) . Together these statements were widely considered in the literature to constitute a clear securitizing move, one which moreover fulfilled all three of the facilitating conditions for successful securitization detailed by Buzan et al in A New
Framework for Analysis. First, it clearly followed the accepted grammar of security. Specifically it made the linkage between HIV and security by reference to three arguments, all of which were couched in terms which were widely understood to be legitimate security claims:
(i) That uniformed militaries (including peacekeepers) were especially vulnerable to HIV and might act as agents in the spread of the disease.
(ii) That state stability was at risk in high prevalence areas.
(iii) That conflict (including the post-conflict phase) created significant risks for the spread of the HIV virus.
Second, those making the securitizing move were clearly in a position to pronounce on security issues, if nothing else by virtue of their presence in the Security Council. And thirdly, the object (HIV/AIDS) was presented as threatening not only because it was responsible for the deaths of over one million people each year but also because it was portrayed as ultimately representing an existential threat to those states suffering from a high HIV burden.
In 
HIV/AIDS and securitization theory
We have argued elsewhere (McInnes and Rushton, 2010; Rushton, 2010a ) that this orthodox account of the securitization of HIV/AIDS is problematic on a number of empirical grounds. In this section we attempt to use some of those insights to develop securitization theory in three ways. The first is to introduce a discussion of securitization as a multi-level phenomenon consisting in the HIV/AIDS case of a series of separate securitizing moves being made to a range of audiences, from the national up to the global. The second is to elaborate on Rita Abrahamsen's (2005) suggestion of a 'security continuum' -that securitization and 'normal politics' are not binary positions but the two end points of a spectrum -along which different audience members may occupy different positions.
Finally we explore the role of empirical evidence in securitization and de-securitization.
Multi-level securitization
Although Highlighting the importance of the nature of the securitizing actor and the strategies they employ, Holbrooke and his team were successful in overcoming this opposition partly because of the US's influence in the Council, but also as a result of a variety of other contributing factors including
Holbrooke's own persuasive character, the willingness of key experts to vocally support the securitizing move (notably the Executive Director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot), and HIV/AIDS' special status as a global issue. Crucially, few states wished to be publicly seen to oppose action to address such a major humanitarian catastrophe. The adoption of Resolution 1308 was not, then, simply the result of a universal agreement on the validity of the securitizing claims; rather it was adopted despite the fact that significant doubts were present, especially amongst other Permanent Members.
Ultimately, however, the Council members were persuaded to unanimously support Resolution to show that HIV is not 'merely' a development problem is that it coincided with an unprecedented explosion in efforts to promote international development, expressed most concretely through the MDGs.
To understand this more complicated story of the securitization of HIV/AIDS we introduce the idea of securitization as a multi-level phenomenon. The securitizing actors involved in the various parts of the process identified above each addressed a particular constituency or level of analysis. One of the consequences of this multi-level securitization is that at each level the actor and audience changes.
To some extent that would be expected with any securitization which originated within a single state and then spread to other states. The HIV/AIDS case, however, suggests an interesting insight about the way in which multi-level securitizations affect our understanding of the relationship between securitizing actors and their audiences. In this case the original audience effectively became the securitizing actor at the second level. Thus, as described above, at the first stage officials within the Clinton administration were the audience. Some of those officials who had been persuaded by the securitizing claims then took those claims forward into the Security Council. For us this dynamic highlights the importance of intersubjectivity in the securitization process, suggesting not only that
Balzacq is right to characterise securitization as an argumentative process rather than a performative one, but also that he is right that an 'empowering audience' (Balzacq 2010: 8-11 ) is fundamental to securitization. If persuaded, such empowering audiences can then take up the securitizing claims as their own and seek to persuade others. Indeed what the securitization process in the HIV/AIDS case most resembled was something akin to the 'norm life-cycle' which has been described elsewhere in the constructivist literature (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) : a norm entrepreneur (in this case a 'securitization entrepreneur') was able to first persuade a limited audience to accept the case that HIV/AIDS is a security issue, and subsequently set in motion a 'cascade' through international society (albeit, as we have argued, in practice it only 'cascaded' to a limited extent). There may be a need, then, to further interrogate this actor/audience dynamic, and social constructivist work from outside the Copenhagen School, particularly the literature on the role of audience persuasion in norm building, may have much to contribute conceptually in this area.
Partial Securitization, the Security Continuum, and the adoption of emergency measures
This leads us to our second theoretical point, which addresses the range of different opinions which may be present within an audience, even when confronted with the same speech act. The second level of the multi-level securitization of HIV/AIDS which we outlined above offers the starkest example of this. The fact that Holbrooke, Gore and Piot (three of the key securitizing agents) saw HIV/AIDS as a potential existential threat to states seems clear, even if they were partly motivated by an instrumental desire to get greater political attention for the pandemic. But it is apparent that their audience, the 14 other members of the Security Council, placed the issue at very different points along this continuum, with the securitizing claims being highly controversial within the Security Council. which the Security Council felt duty-bound to do something about HIV/AIDS given the growing sense at the time of a humanitarian crisis in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. To oppose such action would have been extremely difficult politically for Council members, and helps explains why they did not feel able to publicly speak out against the Resolution. But the nature of the Council is that, having decided it must do something, the only thing which it could do within its mandate was securitization:
declaring the pandemic a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, this was also a time in which ideas within the international community about what constitutes a security issue were changing rapidly. These changes were perhaps more clearly evident in the Security Council than anywhere else. Wallensteen and Johansson (2004) were not all in fact persuaded. We offer two theoretical reflections here. The first is that the success/failure question may be based upon a problematic assumption that securitization is a binary either/or state. In reality the situation may be much more complex. Abrahamsen (2005: 59) argues that issues rarely move directly from normal politics to being securitized as an existential threat; rather security issues can move along a continuum, with most falling short of the existential threat required for full securitization:
[M]ost security politics is concerned with the much more mundane management of risk, and security issues can be seen to move on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and to existential threat... The process of securitization is thus better understood as gradual and incremental, and importantly an issue can be placed on the security continuum without necessarily ever reaching the category of existential threat.
Ole Waever has also identified the spectrum between security and normal politics as an area requiring further investigation (2003: 26) , noting in a wide-ranging overview of the state of the art in securitization theory that 'there is a need for more work on de-securitisation and failed acts of securitisation, and finally partial securitisation could be worth exploring.' One of the reasons for partial securitization may be that some members of an audience are persuaded whilst others are not. This lack of a consensus therefore presents a situation of partial securitization, and depending upon the balance of opinion an issue will be placed at some point along this spectrum. What we wish to suggest, however, is more nuanced than this. HIV/AIDS clearly offers examples of states (the UK being one example) which are neither wholly convinced nor fully sceptical. In other words, different audience members would place the issue at different points on the spectrum between normalcy and existential threat.
The second reflection is that practices may in some cases offer a stronger indication than language that something is being addressed in security terms. In other words, what actors do may tell us more than what they say. One of the central ideas in securitization theory is that securitization legitimates the taking of 'emergency measures'. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998: 25) are careful to note that there is no requirement in their theory that an emergency response has to actually come about ('only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity'); but they do suggest that in the absence of an accepted legitimate basis for such measures 'we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an object actually being securitized. Thus, although the absence of emergency measures may not in itself be conclusive, it may offer an indication that an issue has not been fully securitized. It would be hard to make a strong case that the Council's actions in relation to HIV/AIDS over the last 10 years has provided evidence that the represented by the adoption of Resolution 1308. As we now move on to address in the final section, the Council's subsequent treatment of the AIDS issue seem to add weight to this conclusion, pointing to a situation in which at the global level HIV/AIDS has gradually moved back down the security continuum towards normalcy (though it may be argued that within the US it remains securitized).
De-securitization and the role of empirical evidence
The Copenhagen School's initial outlining of securitization theory contains within it a warning against securitization, noting two key problems. First, that applying the security label to a wide range of issues risks state involvement where that might prove 'undesirable and counter-productive'; and second that security is in danger of being '[elevated] into a kind of universal good thing -the desired condition toward which all relations should move… this is a dangerously narrow view. At best, security is a kind of stabilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through the emergency mobilization of the state' (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 4) . Reservations over securitization are especially evident in Waever's earlier work which introduces the idea of de-securitization -that is, how an issue might be returned to the realm of normal politics, an idea which also receives attention in New Framework for Analysis (Waever, 1995: 56-7; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 4) . These concerns resonate powerfully with the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue (e.g. Elbe, 2006) . In particular the belief that securitization increases state control creates the potential for a series of negative impacts with HIV/AIDS, not least in sidelining opposing viewpoints, prioritizing security issues in the prevention and treatment of disease and in curtailing civil liberties. Sjostedt example, the low prevalence rates in Angola were linked to the fact that it had suffered prolonged conflict, whereas previous claims would have suggested that conflict would lead to increased prevalence (McInnes 2010 (McInnes , 2011 ).
This is significant in theoretical terms because it suggests not only that arguments appealing to empirical reality (even though they weren't backed by much in the way of evidence) were an important part of the original persuasion process (thus backing up Balzacq's position) but also that de-securitization is possible when empirical evidence is available which directly challenges the claims about reality on which the securitization was originally based. Thus, we would argue, appeals to empirical evidence are important both to securitization and de-securitization. In making such a claim, of course, we need to remain sensitive to both agency and social context. The effects of the emerging empirical evidence were uneven in the HIV/AIDS case. Clearly there is not a direct link between evidence and (de)securitization. In the United States, the most ardent advocate of securitization and a state which has remained wedded to HIV as a security issue, the emerging evidence about the complexity of the links did not lead to a desecuritization process. What we would suggest is that the growing empirical evidence was used by those who were already sceptical of the link in order to downplay the relationship and move instead towards de-securitization. The empirical evidence did not in itself lead to de-securitization, but rather was vital in creating the space which allowed de-securitizing moves to occur.
Conclusion
18 Our claim here is based on extensive interviews in Geneva, New York and Washington with officials close to Council deliberations.
It is difficult to deny that HIV/AIDS is a global tragedy which has caused many millions of deaths and has ruined countless more lives. But it is not obviously a security issue, at least not in the narrow national/international security sense. Nevertheless, for more than a decade the case has been made that HIV/AIDS impacts on the security of states and regions, and therefore requires exceptional action. The UN Security Council, through its discussions on the issue and its passing of Resolution 1308, is generally identified as the crucial actor in securitizing the disease. In this article however we have suggested that the securitizing process has been significantly more complex than is generally recognized in the literature. We argue that although the debates in the Security Council and the passing of Resolution 1308 appeared to conform to the facilitating conditions identified by Buzan et al for a successful securitization, the role of the speech act was less important than contextual
conditions. This in turn pushes us towards endorsing later versions of securitization theory, especially the ideas of Balzacq, in explaining the securitization of HIV/AIDS. An examination of the securitizing process also reveals a dynamic which suggests that multi-level securitizing processes might occur in which an issue begins to gain momentum and credibility at a lower level and works its way up to the global level. With HIV/AIDS, the first move was made within the US domestic policy context, the second by key US officials in the Security Council, and the third when the Council's endorsement was used to legitimize arguments being made to the wider international community.
However, the reservations of other members, when added to concerns over the empirical evidence, meant that HIV/AIDS was not fully securitized and indeed, over the course of the past decade, moved back down the continuum in the direction of 'normal politics'. This leads us to suggest both that empirical evidence can be important in undermining the credibility of securitizing claims (though not necessarily in precluding the securitization process being initiated), and that securitization is not a binary condition but a continuum along which different actors may be located at different positions. It also leads us to suggest a more complex relationship between actor and audience. In so doing we are aware that we have opened up other questions to be pursued.
Amongst those we would suggest are: the relationship between securitizations at different levels;
how to identify various stages along a security continuum; and identifying how and when a partial securitization becomes a full securitization. We are also aware that we have entered an ongoing discussion over the role of context and empirical evidence in securitization. Our intention was not to resolve this discussion but, in identifying the role empirical evidence played in opening up the space for the desecuritization of HIV/AIDS, hopefully contribute something to that debate. We have also suggested the possible uses of constructivist work from outside the Copenhagen school in interrogating the actor/audience dynamic, including the idea of a norm life-cycle. 
